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HUrdAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES·
TWO DECADES' DEVELOPMENT
-by David ·S.

BOGEN~

LL.B .. LLi\1.

Assistant Professor of L<1w
Unirersity of Jfu.ryland
School o( Lau·
B.•ltimore, Jfar.'lland

-lfltis -papet--surveys--the -dcvelo·plrtt'nt- of ···human--rights- in·
· the United States during the past two decades. Even brief
comment on all matters which might be considered human
rights would require a book. This more modest undertaking
discussl's only those ;:ights arising out of the creation of &
democratic system of government, .the protection of individual
rights in a system of .criminal justiee. and the protection of
minority groups against discrimination.
'l'he focus of this discussion i<J on the deci<Jions of the
courts. The legi<Jlature and the executive establish some principles of lmn!f!n rig-lib; (1) and they provirle procedures to effectuate prindples derived from other sources (2). But our
most -basic human rights arc guarantees in the Constitution,
and it is the function of the Supreme Court to interprei those
guarantees in the specific cases .before it.. Since tl1e government has e.nforcecl the Court's decisions with respect to the
pa rti0S before the Com1, those decisions mark a point at whlch
rights will be vindicated.
Victory in a law suit does not mean that no one will ever
deprive at;other of that particular right again. 1\Ien and

(!) f. g. c The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the federal Government to use all practicable m&anS consistent
with its needs and obljgations and pther essential ce>nsiderations of national
policy ... to coordinate and utdi::e all its plans, functions and resources for· the
purpose of creating and maintaining... conditions under which there w1ll be
aflorded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment. for those
crble, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power." 15 U.S.C. 1021 {19~6). Also Congress has
provided minimum wage and hour lcnvs {Fair Labor Standards. Act 29 U.S.C..
§ 2Dl-19) and granted workers the .right to organize unions free of employer
interlerence (National Labor ·Relations Act 29 U.S.C., § 151-68).
(2) E.g. Laws requiring the presentation of opposing viewpoints In the radio
and television industry. 45 U.S.C.. § 315 (a) {1964) ; 37 C.F.R. 13.123, 13.300,
73.595 and 73.679. See also tire l<>gislcrtion discussed in the text affecting voting
rights, public accommodations and employment.
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governments will always do what the laws and the courts
declare is "-Tong. The victims of such acts may not be able
to get damages or a court order to remedy such >rrongs. They
may not have the sophistication or financial resources necessary to commence litigation. They may fear that social pressures against them for having bron~ht suit wouid be more
harmful than any benefit derived by such suit.
Finally,
they may be defeated in their suit_ by procedural obstacles
before they can get a decision on the merits.
However, jt .
·remains true that the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court interpreting the Constitution provide the basic yard,
stick by which to measure the progress of human rights in the
-·united Si<'ltes· overi:he past twenty-years:·- - -------

, I. -

Democratic government

Electoral procedures have become far more democratic in the past ten years as a result of several major changes. A
Constitutional amendment, new statutes and judicial decisions
have made it easier for the poor man and black man to vote
and have made each person's Yote of equal effect. Progress
has been less dramatic in other areas which are preconditions
for a democratic society, but speech and travel have fewer
restrictions as a result o:f judicial deeisions over the past
twenty years. The separation between church and state has
been increasingly defined and an uneasy compromise between
religious toleration and religious need maintained.

. A. -

THE RIGHT TO VOTE

Questions of civil rights and civil liberties generally arise
in the context o:f the relationship between the indindual and
his government. Thus the basic civil right is free and equal
suffrage. Unkss the government is responsive to the people
and each individual has an equal participation in the creation
of the ~overnmcnt, the vap between the citizen and te government will widen to the detriment of both civil rights and the
citizen's r~pect for the law.

In 1964, a constitutional amendment was adopted.
Tke right of citizens of the U11ited States to vote in any
primar1J or other election for President or Vice President,
for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator

in Cnngress, shall not be denied or
nbridgr:d by the United States or any State by rcnson of
t~n7ure tr~ ]J(l!J any 1Joll tax or other tax (3).
r'r Rr[>NSOifrrth•es

Cntilll%li. however, the rights to vote for ·state office was
still tC>:Hliti,;!1rd in some statPs upon the payment of a poll
tax: ot up t0 8 ~.
Then the Supreme Court declared such a
tax un•:o!lstiturionnl as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendmend of tl:e Constitution which prohibits a ;;;tate from Q(·aying
an~· pen;on "'equal protection of the laws". The Court stated :
''\"\-e:1lth or fee pa:'·ing hns, in our view, no relation to voting·
1p.wlitication~ ; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental
- t<:r lJe so -brrrdeue·ct or cotiditioiii.;d -(4r"- -T:ne CoilrCalso im-=-a.:-·
Iidated on the basis of the ""equal protection"clause, a pro·<:i;;;ion
of a state constitution which prevented members of th€ arm€d
services who moved to that state from ;:requiring a votin(!: residence ther€. "There 1~ no indication in the Constitution that ...
occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State (5)." Even elections
for a limitefl purpose, and not for general representation in
the goTernment. nnist indude all qualified voters having therequisite of residencce and age u....'iless "the exclusions are necessar: to promote a compelling state interest (6)." Under tllis
stan.1ard , the Court invalidate-d a pro-.;-ision for school"board
elections whiel1 required voters either to own taxaule real property within the school district or be parents of children
enrolled in. the local public schools (7).
The most difficult voting problem in the United States
has been to implemei1t the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee
that "'the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude (S).'' The Comt invalidated the exclusion of negroes
by a political part;;- in its primary election where that political
party dominated elections in a county (9).
It held that a
citY conld not redefine its borders in order to exclude th!}
ar~as where negro voters lived (10).
In another case, the

(3) U.S. Cor.st. amend. XXIV.
l~J Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electio1l3, :JS3 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
{5) Carrington v. Rr:mp, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
{6) Kramer v. Union Free School District, :o• 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
(7) ld.
(8) U.S. Canst. amend. XV.
(9) Terry v. Adam~. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Nominees o! the associcrtlo,; "\ln!te·
always no:nincated as the candidates of the Democratic party which alway• ,
won the elections in that county.
00) GonuWon v. Ligbttoot, 354 U;S. 339 (1960).
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Court found that a state· requirement that voters "'inter·pret''

.a cause of the state or federal Constitution selected hv the
voting registrar ,,·as part of a plan to dt'pri•e negl'oes of their
right to vote, and it affirmed an injtmction to stope the use
-of such a test (11). Even where the literacy test was fair on
its face and fairly administered, the Court struck it (lo'm
where its ·effect, hecatisc of a prior disability in education,
·was to Or>IWive largP numh<>J-s of n<>groes of the franchise {12).
Further, staks eanuot !l<'siguate tlw race of c~mdidatcs on·
the ballot (13).
obstacles~

Case by
Negroes were
afr.aid to bring suit for fear of the community reaction against
:them__ Hven_a:f:ter iha.. Giv_iLRights Act of 1957 gave the
Attorney General a powt•r to bring -~uit -agaimt- -a--state.
its offi.eials to protect the voting rights {)f negroes (14), progress was slow. To remedy this -deficiency, Congress passed
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (15). The Act covers af1y
-state or sub:division .of a state which maintained .a "test or
-device~ ~ Df Noven1her L 1%4 and '\'here the DirPctor of Census detcrmint>d that 1<'ss than 50 <;o of its voting-age residents
wer~ registered to vote on No>einber 1, 1964, or voted in ·the
presidential election of tl1at yrar. It provided that no person
could lJe denied the right to vDte because of this .failure to
· ~omply ,dth such test or device or any subsequent test or
. deVice to \vhich the Attorney Gt'n<'rnl of the l)nited States
ltas objected. In addition, the feticral civil scrvite commission
\VaS reqtiired to ap-point Toting e.'::aminers whenever the Attorney. General certified. <'it1H'r that he had reeeiv~d meritorious
complaints from at least twenty residents that they have
1,een disenfranchio:;cd under color of law berausc of their rat<',
or that t]fe avpointment of examiners was otherwise nece_ssary
to effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment (16) .
But judif,ial action faced formitlahle

. ease adjudieation is a slow piecemeal process.

ancr

.(11) Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 1;15 (1965).
{12) Guston County, North Carolina v. United Stoles, 39S U.S. 28S (1959).
(13) Ander.son v. M~, :rJS U.S. 399 (1964).
(14) 42 u:s.C: sec. 1971 {c). See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128
(1965).
(15) 42. U.S,C. sec. 1973 et seq.
(16) These provisiOns were upheld as a proper exercise of congressional
power under fu.e Fil.teer}th J\mendment in State of South ·Carolina v. Katzenbacb,
383 U.S. 301 (1956). the Voting Rights Act also stated thcrt no person wl::o
colnpleted the ·sjxlh grade in a public school .or in a private school accedited
-:by, 1he Commonwealth of ,Puerto Rico. in which the language of bstruction was
oilier· than .English could be denied the franchise because of his inability to
read or write English. This was upheld as constitutional in Katzenbac:h v. }.forgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1956).. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 84 Stat. a1..o1 extended
-the right to vote to !8 year olds. In most ,states the age limit was 21 years.
"The validity of the Act ia ·being challenged. W. the Supreme Court.

The value and the purpose of the right to vote is diminished unless every person's vote is given equal weight. In
almost every state, each person's vote was counted equallyin choosing the. reprrsentative from his area (17). Ho"\\·cver,
in many states the number of persons represented by· each
lcgi.<:;l:ttor varied ·w-ide1y. Thus, the vote of a legi<>lator representing 10,000 would be equal to the vote of a legislator
r~prP.scnting 90,000. Prior to 19D2 tho Court refused to deeidc
the constitutionality of dispropm·tionate· districts on the
grounds that the issue \Yas politicai and 110t judicial in
nature {18). In 1962 the court hPld that the issue should be
~eeided {19). In subsequent -decisions it held that congres-sional· ·di.stricts- -for rqm:srntatiorr -in --tire -fcdera1- House--or-Representatin's must ht'. equal in population CWI, that the
scats in hoth houses of a bj-cameral state legislature must
be app9rtioncd on a population basis -(21) -even if the majority
of the state's voters ..aiJprow a different basis (22), and that
offices in the local eount;.- w-ithin a state must be voted for
on a population hasis (23).
Legislators represent ·people, not trees or aaes... Wdgh·ing the '!Jotes of citizens differently, by any method or
me(mS, 1ne·rcly becnnse of where they happen to reside,
lllmlly seems justijiablt.... Since legislatures are responsible for owctinu lag·s by u·hich all citizens m·c to be
governed, they shnnld be bod1:es 1r.:h1'ch are collecti·z:cly
responsible to the popular ":will. And tlw umccpt of equal
protection has bern fraditionallJJ t:ieu·Fd as requiri11g the
uniform treatment of perso-n sta·nd-i·ng in the S(l.mc relaNon to the gol'crn mental action q-ne.stioned or challenged. With respect to the allocation of legislative rezn·cse?dation, all •t~ofcrs, ns citizens of a State, stand in the
sa·me relation regnrdless of where they li'L;e. .,by S1tggestcd criteria for the di.(fr:·rentiat·ion of citizeus are insufficient to jw:tify any tli.~criminrzfinn. ns to fJH< 1eeight nf
tJwir t'otes, unless relcrrznt to the permissible purposes of
lc!}islati1.Je apport·iomncnt. Since the achie·vi11g of fair and

(17) But see Gray v. Sanders, :rlZ U.S. 36ll {1963) -which lnvalid:rted Georgia's
county unit system under which st:rtewide representatives -were chosen in a
way which favored rural voters over urban voters.
{18) Colegrove v. Green, 3Z8 U.S. 495 {1946).
(19) Bal::er v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
(20) Wesberry v. s:roders, 376 U.S. 1 {1964).
(21) Reynolds v. Sims, :m U.S. 533 (1964).
(22) Lucas v. forty-/ourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 0964}
atating « A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because
G majority of the people choose to do so.»
Jd. at 736-Sl.
(23) Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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effective representation for all citizem is concededly the
basic aim of leuislrrti·ve apportionment, 1ce concl1lde that
the Equal Protection Clnuse guarantees the oppl)rtunity
for equal partic·ipation by an .voters in the election of
slate legislators (24)

:r:ven if the local, state "or national .office c~uld properly
be an appointive one, "once a state has decided to use the process of popular election and 'once·the class of voters is chosen
and their qualifications classified, we (The Court) see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be
evaded.' " (25).
The right to vote would lose its value if the electeed official
. ___ could not .ser.ve ... -In 1%G-, -the House of Representati>~-s-voted- to exclude Congressman Adam Clayton Pow·ell Jr., on the basis
of his behavior d1.u·ing the preceeding session of Congress. In
1969, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its
· powers and -~ould not exclude any individual elected by the
voters unless such individual ·was ineligible for office by virtue of qualifications sta'ted in the Constitution (26).

B. -

RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH, ASSEMBLY
Al."\TD ASSOCIATION

The intelligent exercise of the right to vote is dependent
on freedom of speecl1 and press so that all sides of· every issue
may }Je examined.
·
The Constitution _provides "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. (27)., Yet
some :restriction on speech has al·ways been recognized. ·"The
most stringent protection. of free speech would not protect a
man in faJscly shouting fire in theatre, and causing a panic." (28). The test traditionally used for determining whether

(24) Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 21 at 562. 563, 565. The composition of
the federal Senate was not called into question or relevant to the decision since
the system of two senators to e01ch state was adopted as a result of a compromise agreement among sovereign states whereas the districts within a alate
ate creations of the state.
· {25) Hadley v. Jrmior College District, 397 U.S. W {1970) requiring equality
Jn voting for trustees of a .Junior college.
(26) Powell v. McCormark,. 395 U.S. 496 {1969). Congressman .Powell was
•eated ln the following Congress •vlt.'Jout incident, but issues involving his hade
pay· during the period of his exclusion are still being litigated.
(27) U.S. Cons!. amend. I.
(28) Schenk v. United State~, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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speech of a political nature may be restricted hn.s been "whether
the words used arc used in such eircnmstances and are of such
·a -nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring ahout the snhstantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent." (2D). This test has been restated recently as
follo1vs : '"The constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." (30).
--·For exfl:mple;--the .Cou-rt reversed ·the eom>k-tions-of· anti-war
protesters where tl1e trial judge stated they could be convicted
for doing or sayin!_i '"that which offends, disturbs, incites, or
tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area."
The Court held that conviction on such a ground ·:was an abridgement of freedom of speech (31).
· ··
The dominant trend of court decisions in tlie past two
decades has been require any restriction on free speech to be
drawn in the narrowest pos.~ible terms. In 1941 Congress
passed the Smith Act (32) which made it a criminal offense
to advocate, abet; advise or teach "the duty. necessity, desira
bility, or propri·.::ty of overthrowing or destroying the governme_nt of the United States ... by force or violence... ; ... or ... to
organize any society, group or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate or cneoura~e the o>erthrow or destruction of any
such government by force or violence ; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group or
assembly of persons, lmowing the purposes thereof." (33).
The Supre:rre Court held that the term "organize" referred
only to the creation of a new organization and not to acts
thereafter performed in carrying out its activities (34). Further, the Court held that the Smith Act does not prohibit
~advocncy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract
principle, di;-nrced from any effort to instigate action to that
end." (35). 'Y-!th respect to the membership c1ause, the Dourt
held that the statute does not make criminal any membership
in an unlawful organization with knowledge of its unlawful

(29) Id.
(30) Brondebourg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1909).
(31) Bacheiiar v. Maryland, 3'i!l U.S. S64 .(1970).

C32) 18 U.s.c;. aec. 2385.
(33) Upheld as constitutional in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. -494 (1951).
The Smith Act superseded all alate legislation proscribinq '!edition agcdnst tbe
United States. Peruuylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 4W {1956).
(3-l) Yates ..-. United
(35) lcl. at 318.

States, 3S4 U.S. 298 {1957),
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purpose unless the individual specifically intends to· accomplish that pu11losr. hy resort to violence (36). Suhsequen:t
decisions have made it dear that this intcrpretationpof the ·
statute was lwsrd on constitutional requircmmts of free speech
and due process (37.). _
The application of overbroad· criminal subversive legislation has been enjoined before any criminnl prosecution was·
initiated unJcr it and dcSJJitc the ·fact that the law mig-ht
he limited thmug1l stat<' judicial construction_ ""The chilling
dfcct upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive
·from the fact of the prosecution, unaffecter1 by the propects
of success or faihrrc (38)."
States may enact laws punishing false or malicious defamation of racinl and religious groups (39), but there can be no
prosecution for libel on go.-ernment (40). ~'ill individual
publi1~ figure, cannot recover damages for. a defamatory falsehDod l'clating to his official conduct ~ess he proves that
the statement was .made \vith 'actual malice'-that is, :with
knowledge that it was false or v.-ith reckless disregard of whethf'l" it was ftilse or not {U)."
:Means oiher than civil or criminal penalties haV.e been
'employed to restriet the expression of ideas antitheticru to the
go.,ernment. ·Two mPthods aw loyalty oath requirements for
~mploymmt ancl dismissal :from. or denial of employment on
the grounds of dis1oyalty. The Court has been quick to
strik:t- down lo~-alty oaths for public emplo:vment · or state-.
eonferrcd benefits where they require individuals to prove
their loyalty (42) or where their ,·agueness might be interpreted to cover innocent activity (43) such as membership in
an m·ganization \vithout sharing the i11egal purpose of the
organization ·(44).

(36} Note v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 {1961}.
(37) See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 37B U.S. 500 (1954) ; Eifbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) ; Keyi.shian v. Bocrrd ol Regents of the University of

the .State of New Yorl:, 385 U.S. sag (1957).
(38) Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
(39) Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). This case has been sharply Criticized as an improper inbingement on the right to speak. See EMERsoN,
Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment; lOS (Vintage Books 1966}.
{40) Rose.,blcrtt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, SO (1966); New Yorl: Times Co. v.
Sullivcrn, 376 U.S. 254, 291-92 (1964).
(d) New York Times, supra note 29 at 279-W. See Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964}: Henry v. Collins, 3BO U.S. 356 (1965).
(42) Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. Sl3 (1958).
(43) Cram.p v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Baggett Y.
BuUitt,
U.S. 360 (1964}.
.

m

(44)

Eltbrcmdt v. RussaU, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).

Recently a statute requiring the discharge of teachers for
the utterance of "seditious" words was invalidated on the
grom1ds of Yaguencss. The Court said "'the danger nf that
chiUing effert upon the exercise of vital First Amendment
rights must hr gnnnlecl against h:'r sen...,itive tools '"hich
clearly infol'm· teachers "·bat is being sanctioned (45)." · The
Court hrrs held that a state could not ref.uc;e to admit an individual to the praetiee of law because hr wtts a 'member Df the
Commnnist Pur(\" two decades prcvi0li:s1y (46) and thnt a
st<J.tutc prohibiting persons from sr1·ving Dn the governin~
body of a labor organization who are or have been :within the
last five vea,rs members of the Communist Partv was mva1id
as a bill ·~fatt~ind~r or "'trial by legislature~"' .(47).
The Court has hern rcinctant to ,act where employees
are di<>chm·gcd from deft;nse establishments (-18), but reeently
it required the reiustatement in a shivyard of an employee
who was a member o! the Connimnist Party. The Court pointed. out that the flaw in the law was that membership would .
cause dismic;s..1.l even .if the employee was 1maware of the ain1s
of the .Communi'>t J'arty or disagreed with tl10se aims or was
a pa..o:sin· mcmuer of the organization or the position from.
which he \Vas fired wa.'> mot J1articulurly sensitive (although
withili a "defense :taeilit;V") (±9)'.
In l!lG6 <l state legislature PXChlLh'd ·a rer!l·esentath·e wllO
stated .that he was ·Dpposf'd to the war in Viet ~am and who
· e~ressed his · adnuration for· the courage of those persons
who burn(>d tbeir clraft {:ards (:50) despite the possible jail
senten<:cs. The Court hdd that disqualifieution because of
his statemmts violated 'the legislator·s right of free e~-pres
sion {51). The Court has even enjoined a high school from
suspending students 'Who wore h1ack arm bancls to protest the ·
war ilf- Viet X am ,\·here :;uch action did not interfere with
the activities of the school or intrude on the rights of other
· stud<'nt<; (Ii2). Final!}-. the f'onrt has required reinstatement
of a school tcachf'r •rho made remarks critieal of the school

(45)
(46)
{47)
(48)
(1961).

Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra note Zl at 684.
S.cbware 'V, Beard of Bar Ex=iners .of New Mexico, 353 U.S: 232 .(1957).
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 4'!7 .(l965).
See Cafeteria and RestcruJU!lt Wod:er.FVnion v. McElroy, 3f)l U.S. 886

{'49) United States v. Robel,,989 U.S. 258 (1967).
(50) In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 307 (1968). the Court permitted·
conviction for burning a draft ,,card despite ,arguments that def!!ndant's rights
of free speech .were violated.
(51) Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. ll6 {1956).
(52) T.tnl-er v. Des !Vfoin~. 393 U.S. S03 (1969).
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system, even though those rematks were false (53). The
Court noted that ·such remarks did not in the particular case
prevent the te~ehcr from continuing his work because they
were (lirectcd at more remote or indir!'ct supervisors ::rather
than immediate supcrvisl}ry personnel and that such remarks
should -be protected because they were not knowmgly or reckl<:ssly false statements.
· Expression which is not directly political in nature may
also be important to the social fabric of the nation. Control
over men's thoughts and expressions in any area may have
significant· stultiiying effects on intellectual exploration and
personnel freedom, however necessary such restrictions may
be for Qther _reaso.P..s. S_ta:tes. may .ban .materiaL where _4<.to the-average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest" (54) and which ..goes -substantially beyond
-cm~tomary limits of candor in· description or representation of ·
such matters (55). Nevertheless, "a work cannot be proscribed
unless it is 'utterly' without social importance (56)." In the
application ol these standards "in close cases, e:vidence of
pandering fin the .ad•-erti<;ement and sale] may be probative
·with respect to the nature of the material in question (57)."
The Court has upheld far less stringent standards for obscenity· sold to minors {58). However, possession of ob5cenity
in private without any attempt to sell or distribute it is
constitutionally protected as part of the prot~tion of free
speech combined withca concern over the right o:f privacy.
"Whatever the power of the state to control public di<;semination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of
controlling a person's private thoughts. (59)."
Problems of freedom of expression extend beyond the
content of speech to the manner and place where persons may
speak. The general principales . which g-overn decisions were
stated b~- former .Justice Goldberg when he was on the Court:
There is a proper time and place for even the most peacef1tl protest 01zd a plain duty a11d responsability on the

(53) Pickering v. Board oi Eclur:c:ti.on, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
{54) Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
(55) ld. crt 487, n. 20.; Manual Enterprisoo v. Day, 310 U.S.

·

(56)

]acobeilis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1%1); A Book Named «John Cle-

Jand"lf Memoirs of a Woman oi Plea:rure• v. Attomey Genral ot Massacbusetf:l,

383

u.s.

413. 419-20.

(58) Ginsburg v. New Yor.C, 390 U.S. 629 {1958).

(59) Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
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part of all citizens to obey all ·valid laws and regulatim1s.
There is an equally plain requireme11t for laws and
. reuulations to be drmcn so as to git:e citizens fair warning
as to what -is illegal ; for rcuu.lation of conduct that involves freedom of speech and assembly not to be so broad
i1~ scope ns tn stifle. Pirst Amendment freedoms, which
'need breathing space to survive' N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 ; for appropriate limitations on the
discrefion of public officials where sprech o11d ossembly
m:.e i-ntertwined zcith u_qulatt:d ctmduct._: oild for all such
lau.Js and regulations to be llp]1licd 1cith 1m eqzwl hand (60).
The JIJ,assive peaceful demonstrations throughout the United States. and especially in Washington against the war in
Viet- N am ·and the· polides of- the ..Presid€nt ·demonstrate-the ..
effectiveness of this commitment to public assembly {61).
~-\.lthough problems have occurred in civil rights demonstrations
in~the South, the Court has been quick to protect the rights
of the -demonstrato:rs. For example, a silent demogstration
·in a public library (62) and a noisy one near a courthouse (63)
was permitted, although clcmonstrations on jail gronnds (6-!J
have been prohibited. The. Court has held that a4mll.llstn;tiye
standards which vest great discretion in the administrative
authority are invalid, for the standards must be narrowly
drawn 1:o assure that the denial of a permit is not based on distaste for the speaker's ormarrlwr's point of vew {65). Nevertheless, when an injunction is issued against the demonstration,
even thougn the J.njunetion is based on an improper statute
or adminic;trative rule, the injunction ·must not be ignored but
must he appealed so long as there i<> time to do so (66).

(SO}

Cor·v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, ?74 {l$S) •

The processes for peaceful assembly to protet governmental policy
broke down during pe De:nocratic National Convention in Chicago, llllnoi.s in
1958. See Mailer, Miami and · tbe Siege o1 Chicago. City officials denied per·
:mOts to demonstration !eade:s. -Neverthele"..s, people came to Chicago in large
numberz and ·a riot e""=ued. The legal consequences oi the events oi .Chicago
are still m ·the courls. Conviction of ·five of t.'>a leaciers of the de!Ilonstrc:tion
for « crossing. tate lines with intent to incite a riot ,. is on oppeal 1o ihe United
States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. United. States :v. DeWnger. The trial
received. widespread attention and the processes of t.lc>e court were subjected
to g::<;at criticism. The seven defendants and their lawyers were fourl(i in
contempt ~~ court, bUt that sentence is also on appeal.
(62) Brown v. Lou-isiana, 3S3 U.S. 131 (1960).
{63) (;'ox v. Louisiana, supra note 60. But the Court's opinion was based
-on ihe . indications .c! Louisiana pollee that petitioners had ·not come too near
the courthoilse would . be valid.
. (61)

{64) Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 {1956).
(65) Sbuttle.sworlh v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).

(66) Wall:er v. City ol Birmingham, 388 U.S. 3Ul (1967).
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The rig-ht of free specrh, particularly with reference to
the regnlntion of the nmmrcr of its exercise, is intimately
eonnect<'fl with the rig-llt of assodation. ••Jt is hcvond debate
that frect1om to engag-e in association for the ~dvanccment
of beliefs and idea.<> i<> an iitseparahle aspect of the "liberty"
assured h.'- the Due Pro(~l·ss Cl.:tusc of the Fourteenth Amendlll('llt, whidt embr;1ers fn:cdom of spe<>ch (f,'j) ." "TJwr·e are
tiuH's and eit'l·umst:mees when states may not compel members
o[ :,:ToHps r-ngage•.l in the dissemination of ickas to be publicly
itlcntificd, Bates v. Lilfle Rock, 3£1 U.S. 516 ; N.A.A.C.P. v .
. _llabama, 3;j7 U.S. -±49, 4()2. The reason for those htlldings
was tlmt i<1cntifieation an(t fear of reprisal mi15ht deter perfec- -tl-y ·pt'aeeful dism"l'sions- of r'ublic nfattei-s Of impottance T68) ."
Similar])·, a statt:· statute rl·quiring all teac-hers to list all org-anisations to which they llelong- was im·alidated (69). Finally,
the Court held _that the activi-ties of the ~L\.A..C.P. in asso- .
dating Jor purposes of litig-ation were protected by the First
Amendm<>nt .and ·rnuld not be baned as in1proper solicitation
of legal lmsiness (JO).

C. -

FREED03f OF RELIGIOX

C'loseJy connected \vith freedom of expression is the
concept . .of -freedom of :religion. This includes freedom to
believe as one wishes and to he free from state pressures to
induce a particular belief. The Constitutiou bars the enactment of any· law .:respecting the estahlishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (71)."

.A notary public cannot be denied his commission because
l1c refuses to df'clare that he hclic..-cs in God (7~). A state
cannot dPny unemplo~"ment benefits to a ScYmth Day Adventist 'Who -refuses to take a joh offered her whlch requires her
to work on Saturua)·, her sahhath (73). Congress has exemptetl from service in the armed forces persons who by reason

(67} .National Association lor the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama

•z rei Patterson., 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
!68J Talley "· Caliiomia, 362 U ."S. 60, 1>5 (1960).

(69} Shelton. v. Tucker, 364 U.S. -479 (1960).
{70) NAACP "· Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See al&o Brotherhood ol B.R.
Trainmen .:V. Virginia, sn u.s. 1 {1964).
(71} U.S. Const. amend. 1.
(72} Tor=so v. Watl:ins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961}.
731 Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (19631.

of theh· "religious" training and helicf are consc-ientiously
opposed to rartiripation in war in anv form. The Court
eonstrncfl thi.'> statute to nvoiJ conflict wlth First Amendment
rrqnir·eml·nts. It held that the individuals lwforc it qualified
for the cxPutption, stuting that the test for "'rdi:.dous trninin~
atHl hc1id" '"as "docs the daim to belief occupy the same vlace
in the life of tllC objeetor as an orthodox belief in God holds
in the life of one elcari~· qualified for the exemption {74)."
"That section exempts from military service all those whose
consciem·r·s, SJH11Ted by deeply..:held moral, ethical, or religiow~
"beliefs, '\\:Oi1ld- ~i,""e- them·· no reSt· -or ·t'>eftee if. they allo•re<i _
thcm-sdYes to hrcome a pa!'t o:E an instrument o£ ·war (75) ...
. T~c Court has faced man:-- difficult problems involving
the estahlishment of,rrliginn. It held 1.mconstitutiona1 a state
J)rogram ,\-l1ich permitted churches to offer religious classes
in the sf'110ols to those chilrlrcn ''nose parrnts requested such
instruction (16''. Simi1:n-1y invalit1atcd •rere tlw 11se of a
non-tlenominational prayer (77) or readi11g-s fl'Om the Bihlc .
at the start of the school day (78). Rut the public payment
for Sl'l'nlm· tt'xthooks in Y'-'1ig-ions schools has heen upheld {79),
all(l the tax rx.-·mption for <'hnrch property has also ·with.~oocl
ehnHrng-P in the courts (80).

D. -

C'ITIZEXRIIIP .A..'\D THE RIGHT TO TRAVET..
'<

Tho Constitution proclaims that "All persons born or
nan1ra1izrd in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States (81)." It was not
until reccntl;--, however, that it was determined that the State
rna~· not take citizenship away. Previously, the expatriation
of an indi·dtlual who votrd in a foreign deetion ·and remained
in a fOl'{'ign country to m·oid military seniec was upheld (82).
At tbe same time, the Court held that the 1)cnalty of depriva-

(74) United States v. Seeger. 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
('lS) Welsh v. U~ted Stales,. 398 U.S. 333 {1970).

(76) Illinois e:r rei McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But
it permitted students to leave school !or a portion ol the day to receive reli-

gious Instruction elsewhere. Zorac:h v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
fn) Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
(78) School District ol Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 -U.S. 2ll3 (1963).
(79) Board ol Educ:alion v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
(90) Wab: v. New Yorl: City .Tar CommiSsioners, 397 U.S. 664 {1970).
(81) U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
(82) Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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tion of citizenship for military desertion was a "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of tl1e Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution (83). Si.'< years later the Comt held that to denaturalize n liaturalizcd citizrn for residimr in the land of his
birth offends due process (84). Finally, three years later the
Court said :
·
The 1.:ery nature of our fru government mal·rs it completely i-ncongrous to have a rule of latu und(r tchi,}z. a gro·uz;
of citize1ts if.mporarily in office nm deprivP nnother grrntp
of citizws of their citizenship. We hold that the Four~
teenth Amendment 1/'as designed to, and does, protect every citizen of tl~is nation against a cougressional forcible
d_P.§!Iucfiq~ __qf_lti§.__Qitizcnship .(85.1
·
Part of the significance of citizenship lies in the right to
trawl. In 1868, the Court, after noting the rights of the government to servif'es from its citizens, stated correlative rights .
of the citizen':
He has f]zp, right to come to the seat of govermnent to
assert any cla1:m he 1111/!} 1tave ·upon the got•ernment, or
to tra?ISact any busiuess he 1na.y hat'e w-ith it... He has
a right to free access to its sea-ports,... to the sub-treasuries, the lm1d offices, the revemte offici'S, and the courts of
just-ice in the stveral States. and this right ·is in its n(lf1tre
£ndependnzt of the 1~·ill of ail!f State over whose so1-"l he
must pass in the exacice of it (86).
That opinion declared unconstitutional a t~-.:: on persons
leaving the state. Serenty years later, a statute penalizing·
persons who aid the entrance of ind!gents into the state 'vas
held unconstitutional. The Court said there is a "prohibition ·
against attempts on the part of any single state to isolate
itself from difficulties common to an of them by restraining
the transpo1iation of persons and propert~- across its borders (87)." On the basis of this principle. a century after
first stating- the travel rights of Fnitcd States citizens, tJ1e
Court held unconstitutional state statutes which required
applicants for welfare to rrside in the state for a year before
being eligible for assistance (88).

{83) Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
(84) Schneider V, Rus1r,
163 (!954).
(95) A!royL"!l v. Ruslc, 387 U.S. 253, 268 {1967).

m u.s.

(B6} Crandali v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1868).
(87) Edwcmis v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (19·U).

(SSJ Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

.-
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Another a~ct of the right to travel is the right to leaTe
the cmmt:ry. "The right to traxd is a part of the 'liberty' of.,.·
which the citir.en cannot he deprived 1\ithout due process of
· law '(SD) ." The Comt ruled that the Secretary o:f State hag
no auth0rity. under existing statutes t!i deny passports to
citir.ens because of their beliefs or associations (90). A later
statute nwking it unla·wful for a member of a communist
organization to apply for or use a passport was hdd to be
uncoiL.;;titutional because it was not suffieiently '"narrowly
drawn to preYent the supposed evil (91)." The Secretary
of State may refuse to validate passports for travel to specific
places (92), but no. criminal penalties .exist for persons who
travel in areas for which their _p~sport is 11ot validated (93).

II. -

Crinrlnalj:ustice

#

Guarantees of full and effective participation in government arc not enough. A democratic government can also
destroy hnman rights. The need for protection ag-ainst arbitrary goTernmental action is greatest in the criminal law
process. Th,··J mnjn~· trends dominatf de,cJopments. in law
enforcc:m.:nt ~1uring the past two c1cNtdcs. First, the spe1'ific
Constitutional limitations on the federal government's power
contained in t.he first .eight ~~mendments .have been constru(!d
to appl;- to the States as the "due process" which mlist be
afforded h1· the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, an· affirmative. oblirwtion has been placed -on the state .
to eliminate many of the disadYantages .caused by the poverty·
of an at'cnsed criminal defendant. Finally, tP,e Court has
increasingly interpreted the Constitution to restrir.t the pO'fer ..
of law enfort'emf'nt agrncies to disturb the. dignity and privacy of indinduals
A.- ARREST
An arrest is unlawful unless the state or federal arresting
officer has ''probable cause" to believe that the person arrested

(ll9J Xent "· Dul1e11, '$1
(!10) Id.

(91)

Apth~er Y,

u:s.

11&; 125 (1959).

Secretary ot State, .supra note

(92) .Zemel v. Husf, 381 U,p. 1 (1965).

(93j 'Unllei:l StateS ,;, Latib, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).

~
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has committed a ·crime (94). "Probable cause exists if the
facts and circumstances known· to the officer warrant a prudent man is belieYing that the offense has been committed (9~}."
This requirement has been rigidly enforced. ·where the arr-est
is pursuant to an arrest warrant, the information on whlch
the warrant was based must state the facts which eonstjtute
probable cause, iucntifying the source of the information: If .
the information is not hnsed on the VfTsonal observation of
the officer appl}--ing for the wnnant, hr must give the original
source of thr information nnu reasons why the informant is
to be believed (96). Thr right to resist ·without weapons an
unla"iul arrest ·is generally recognized (97}. There are also
.. ciyil a!_ld crh}1in~l st~t~ntes_ againts. persons makiiJ.g unla:'\Yf11l
arrestc;. But these remedies lmTe not been completly effective (98i. The Court has attempted to stop such unlawful p-ractices by barring the use in criminal eases any information or
evidence ohtainC'd
, as a result of an un1awful.arrest (99).

of

B. -

SEARCH ..A..:.\'D S"EIZrRE

. The law of arrest is closely tieltl to that of search and
seizure. E:s:~~ept where it is impossible io ohtain a search warrant hef-oJ·p the i'YlOC'TI!'e will he moYed or destroy{'<l (100), a
search >Yithout a search \Ynrrant is vn lic1 only if pu;'Snant to a
linvful arl'est {101). Even then. the !';Parch must he r<'il.sonnble (102) and extend only to the person of the defenrhmt
. and the area ..from ''-ithin which he might gain possession

{94) Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; .i;er v; California, 374
u.S. 23 [1963). .
(95) Henry .v. United States, 351 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
(96) Gfordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 {1957) ; Aguilar v. Texas.

u.s. 103 {1964).
.
{97) See ·p>.U!S!:N and -KADisll. Crir.:incl Law· end Its Processes 536 (1969). But
c;rt [east six states _prohibit such r<>sistance.
Che·;igny. « Tne'· Right to Resist
an Unlawful Arrest,» 78 Yale L.J. llZB. 1133 (1969). Note. Cri.:ninal Law : Tl:e
Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest : An Out-Dc!ed Concept, 3 Tulsa -L.J. 46 (!9661 ;
People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308 (1954).; United States v. Dme, 332 U.S. SB! 594

378

{1948).

'

(9S) Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights 39 Minn
L. Rev, 493 (1955). Note, Philad~lphia Police Practice and the bw 'at Arre;t;.
100 U. ot Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1206-12 (\952) ; LA FAv~. Arrest, The Decision to Take
A Suspect into Custody, 412-25 (1965).
·
{99) Wong Sun, supra note 94.
{100) Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; McDonald v. United States
335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ; Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden 387 U.S.
(1967).

(101) Chime] v. Caluornia, 395 U.S. 346 (1957},
(102) See X,remen v. United Slctf!'3. 353 U.S. 346 ~1957).

.
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of a weapon or t1et-1ructible evidence." (103). Like the arrest
warrant, the se;1rd1 warrant must he ba~rd on "probahle
cause" ascertaint:;J from facts supplied the magistrate issuingthe warrant (]0-l). It must particularly describe "the place
to he searched, an•1 the pers011s ot· things to be seized" (10:1).
The prohibition against "'unreasonable searches and seizurc·s" (lOG) a]•pliPs to the states as well ns the federal gowmmcnt (107'1 : :mtl..ct'Yi•knee srem·t'd unlmrfTilly eannot he usrcl
b~- the state against a nefmclant ·(108).
The protettion of the home against unreasonable seawhcs
has also hecn a1h-anced by decisions lw1ding that the Constitution rcctuires a sem·dt warrant for an administrative search of
··the home {100) ·fir phwe of bu.<iillCss (110) as-wcll-as-for searehcs
under the criminal law. However. the opinions recognizP<1
that the '"prohahl<' cause" required for a health or safety
inspeetion would he less than that required for a search for
criminal activit:· and •.might be satisfied hy a showing that the
area had not recently been inspected. ·

C. -

E..:\VESDROPPING AND WIRETAPPING

The d<'YE>lopment of wiretappillg and Plectronie cawsdropping •ll'Yiel'S hf,,·e presented llC\Y and romplex prohlcrns
for the -pn·srlT.ation of the seeurity of tlw Jl(>l'Ron and property
of individuals. Evidence secured through a listening device
attached to tbe person of a. police inform~mt '"ho entered the
premises at the invitation of the owner has hcen held admi<>sible (111). But the Court indicated at an early date that the
plachig of a li'ltming device on another's premises by trespass violated the Fourth Amendment (112), and the Comt

(103) Chime!, supra note 101.
(104) Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) ; Aguilar v. Texas, supra
note 96.
(105) U.S. Cons!. aml!nd. IV.
(106) U.S. Cons!. amend. IV.
(107) Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
(lOS) Mapp v. Ohio, :367 U.S. 643 (1961). Not applied retroactively. Link·
letter v. Walker, :381 U.S. {1905).
(109) Camara v. Municipal Court oi the City and County o1 Sa!J Francisco,
381 u.s. 523 (1967).
.
(110) See v. City of· Seattle, 387 U.S. 451 (1967).
(111) On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; but xnore recent cases
suggest that the court may only allow such recordings to corroborate the testimony of a witness. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 4Z7 (1963) ; Orbom v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
(112) Irvine v. Calilontia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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excluded evidence obtained by a spike mike which ,had been
drivrn into a party wall (113). Finally, the Court held that the
u.•:;e of electronic dc,·ices to capture a conversation is a "search'"
under the Fr>nrth Amendment, and tl1at the "probable cause"
and spccifitity requirements of a warrant are applicable (1'14),
whether or not any trespass oceurs (115).
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
which prohibited the una.uthorized interception and divulgence of any communication by \Yire was construed to bar
the usc of wiretap evidence obtained by federal {116) or
state (117) officers in federal or state (118) court. A 1963
statute now permits court- approved wiretapping to investigate
·eertain ·crimes- (119), hut--the. recent ..decisions .on electr.on:ic.
surveillance har:e made it clear that ·wiretapping is a "search
and seizure" regu1at.cd by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (120) .

D. -

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to .;. the· assistance
of counsel for his defense." (121). Since 1938 it has been
recotrnizcd that in all federal criminal cases, the accm;ed i3
entitled to have counsel furnished by the government if he
isunablc to pay for one (12:.;). But in 19-!2 the Court heM
that due 11rocess did not require states to :fumish counsel
in non-capital cases (12~). The. validity of this decision was
undermined when the Court held that a state violated the
equal protection elause in refusing to provide indigents with
a free transcript on which to base their appeal (124).. Two
decades after announcing that states need not furnish counsel
to indigents, the Court reversed itself and said that the appoin-

Silverman v. UI!ited States, 365 U.S. S05 (1951}.
Berger v. Stcte of New Yorl:, 3B8 U.S. 42 (1967).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 {19.;''7).
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 {1957).
Lee v. Florida, 391 U.S. 378 (1968).
18 U.S.C., § 2516.
(120) lCatz v. United States, aupra note 115.
. (121) .U.S. Cons!. amend. VI.
(122) Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Walh>r v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275
(1941). The statutory provision for providing counsel In federal courts is 18
U.S.C., I S3006 A.
.
(123) Bett:r v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
n':IA\ r....tm" w
mlnni• liS! U.S. 12 119551.
(113)
(114)
(ll5)
(115)
(117)
(118)
(119)
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tmcnt of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial.
From the bcginniug, our state and national constitu-tions
and lint'S Jurl'e lnid great emphasis on procedural and
substm1tive safeguards-designed to assure fair trials before
imparfirr7 tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
btfore- thr. law. Th·is 1wbie ideal cmznot be t·ff17ized if
the pour man charged zrith crime hns to face his acc-users
u·itJwut a lawyer to assist him (125).
Counsel must also be provided the indigent defendant
for hi<> appeal from a conviction (126).
The :right to co.unsd .attaches_prior to triaL The. police
violate the defendant's right to counsel if they refuse his
request to see hi'l attorney while he is in tlle police station
for questioning (12'7). A suspect is also entitled to have
counsel present when he is shown to ,\itnes.o;;es in a "lineup"
for identification' (128).

E

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRil\'IlNATION

"Xo person... shall be compelled in any criminal ease to
be a witness against himself." {129).
{C] onvictions follou;ing the admission into evidence of
confessions which a·re involuntary, i. e., the prod·Hce of
coercion, either physical or psycho7ogicnl, wnnot sfatld.
This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to
be tnce bu.t because .the methods 1fsed to extract thent
offend and nnderly·ing principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law ; that ours 1·s an accusator£al and not an
inquisitorial system~ system in which the State must
esta07ish guilt by evidence independently and freely
SPC1tred rrnd moy 11ot by coerdnn prnve its charge against
an acc1tsed mtt of his mouth (130).

Ph;rsical coercion by federal or state officers is clearly
prohibited (131). fl';ychological coercion, while also foi·bidilen,
(125) Gideon v. Wainwriab!,

m

U.S. 335, 344 [1963).

eg., Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 {1954).
(126)
(127)
(128)
(129)
(130}
(131)

Douglas v. California, '572 U.S. 353 (l963).
E.7cobedo v. Illinois, 378 UcS. 478 {1964).
.United States v. Wade, 3B8 U.S. 218 (1967}.
U.S. Const. emend. V. '
llogezs v. llicbmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
.Brown "· MWU;sippl, 'JSl U.S. 218 (1936).

Applied relroactively
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is mo1·1' di ffieult to drtt'Yminc. Cases in whi<:h the Oourt
fountllmluwful psyc:hologital coercion include thirty-six hours
of unintcrruptcu twestioning (1:32), fh·c lvmrs intrrrog-ation
of a iift('ell :n.•ar old bo~· (J 3J), nine consceutive hum-s questioning of a mentally ill individual (]:1-:l:), and the refusal to
permit a nwn to tdt·p]t.,Jle his \\·ifc until he eonfPssed (135).
The (liffil'nlty of dt>t,···!ninilt!! 'Y11dhrr :1 f•onfc·ssion was compelled by psycholo0ed cocn·ion or givc:tl voluntarily is obvious.
A stanilunl ·whidl Ilu•.:tu<ltl'U \';ith the indi.-iJual's ability to.
withstand ps:n.:hological pressures could provide little guidance
for prop{'r police eonduct. The incrrasi11g concern of the
IJ_gurt -~() prennt police usc of measures of :psychological
COffilJUlsion aguinsf .. SUSpects- combined -,,-ith the principle- of
the ·~rig-ht to com1sel" cases that the poor and ignorant should
1-ccein:· the same treut;nent from the lmr as the wealthy and
eclnc-uted resulted in the formulation of a set of rules by the
Court.
'
{'VJ hrn a·n ·it•di·ridual is tahen into cu.stody or otherwise
depril.'Nl of his :frrol'llll by the authorit-ies in M1JI significrud 'it·ay rmd ·is .subjectul to questioning, thr pr·iv11ege
ayainst sc!f -·l:11crim i; . rrf rm1 is jcopilrilizr:cl ... He mnst be
wnnwZ prior to 111lJI quest-i.rming, that h.e lws tlle right
tv rn11ain silent. thut auythiuy he say:> can be nscd
against him iJt a £'!!IU'f of luw. fl,Jf h ],,!~ f!,,· ri!1i1! fo the
JH'aC}ICt uf an flli';J'iiC!J, and flwf if he cmwot nf!ord an
affori1f!J one wm be n.ppniHfrd for l!illl prior to f'11!J quesfio:•inrJ ;f llr sn d, _,.:rs. O]i?"-'rhmif!J to e.r.crci.w• fhr-.~c
ri!flifS m11st bt nf•·rdrd Mill tlm•i(_(J;ililtf flu: idcrrogl!t-iO·Jl. ·
. .lf+u BIICh 1''1:1'11 [,, fjS llflrC Ju'ni yh·r.n, 1111d Sl!ch nppnrflrnil!t nfforif,if l1im. nu~ i11d·iv<'dmtl may hrl}wiiltPv m1d
·iNfdlitfCJltly wnit·c fhc.'" ~·ights n1:d rr._nrcc tn answer qnPsfions m· mrrkr n. sfatcmhd. B1d -nn!css 1111d nnfil snch
warnings and waiver arc demonstrated by the proscc·u.tion
nf trial, no n·idn1cr 1Jbtnh1Hl aR a result of infcrro!Jation
COil

be used (t{!flinst him (1~6).

CoeJ-r·ion to ohtain sclf-inerimin:1tin ~~ stat{~nwnts is not
limited to the pol in: station. Inv<'stigations h_v- grana juries·
or l<>g-i!-;latiw (•ommitte<'~ may require the trstimony of a witness. HefnStll to ::mswer may he punished. Dut if a responsive

(132) khcrait v. Tcnn.,.ssee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943).
(133) Haley v. Oruo, 332 U.S. 4.96 (1948).
(134) Blacl:bourn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
(135) Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
(136) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 4.36, 478-79 (1966). These rules do not
Clpply retroactively. John#on v. New Jersey, 364 U.S ..719 (1966).

ETUDES

nHs\n·r to a question or an explanation of why it cannot be
U!lS\\Pred. mi~ht furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to lll'u.-;eeutc criminally, the \\'itness may assert his privilege
llf!ain~t self-im·rimination (1l:l7). 'rhe privill:'gc protects a state
·witness agaiust ilH:riJ:Jination under federal as '\Y{'ll as state
la\\", alt•l a. f.t•dt•ral "·itness agairu;t incrimination und\'r stattas well as federal ltH\. (1!38). \Yherc thE' sanction Ior refusal
to testify at an irHJttir}; is dismissal from a government positioiJ,, sucl1 testimony is considered "'coinpelled" and may not
he used against the witnrss in a criminal prosecution (139).
Furtlwr,. m;=;t'rtiun of the .:privikgc crumot-JJe made ground fox
disbarment (140) or dismissal from a public teaching position,
(141) unless the questions specifically relate to the perfot·man(~e of offic'ial dutiPs (142).
'"'~he privilege against selfincriminatic.n \I01Jlrl be reduc.:d to a hollovt mockery if :its
exerc-ise could be taken as equi,·alent either to a confession of
guilt or a conc1usiYc vresumption of perjury (143)"'. Comment
nt t1·ial b~~ the prnseeut01· on the failure of the accused to
testif~- is forbiddcJt hc•raust: it penalizes ~he assertion of tb.
priYiiege (1-1-!).

F.- TIAIL
The imprisonment of an individual prim· to trial rPsu1ts
in puni<;lunent prior to a determinatio11 of guilt. To ameliorate this <·onclitirm, most states gu:n-:mtec a rig-ht to lmil sd
in eYer~· 11011-capital f•:JSI'. The amount 'of hail must JJ•1t he
excessiw (145), and stnmln1·t1s f01· fixing it in federal cmws lll't>
:-:et p1·n·snant to tlw P.nil Heform Aet of 1%6 whose stated pur-

pose 1s :
- ...to assure that all i•<'t-sons t•egnn1ks of finaneial statue,
shall not JH'N11rssl~- be r1etainN1 prlH1ing tlwh· :rpppat·ance
to an~m-,,r eh:J.rg···s, to testi+~-, fll' !Wnding- appeal, whcll
1letention SC'n-Pc1 ndther the ends of justi('C nor tlw puhli!!
interest (1-l6) ."

(137) Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1954).
(138) Murphy v. Watelront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1954).
(139} Garrity v. New Jersey, 3S6 U.S. 493 (1967).
(140) Spevaclc v. Xlein, 385 U.S. 5!1 (1967).
(141} Slo::hower v. Board ol Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956}.
U42J Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).

REVUE L"TER.,.,ATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL

An important development has been the increasin..,. -use of
"pre-trial parole" wh~;rc the accused is freed on his o'~n recognizan~e if the facts suggest that it is unlike~y he will attempt
to escape being tried (147).
-

G.- SPEEDY TRIAL
The accused is entitled to be speedily brought to
trial (148). He may p,ot be left languishing in jail or even
free on bail for an unreasonable length of time. Even when
__ ~he_ aCGUScd is released without bail because the prosecutor has
filed a nolle prose:qui (rCiiisal to pi·osecute -at this tiine\against
the wishes of the defendant, the rig-ht to a_ speedy trial ,prevents
the state from later rearresting him and trying him on the
same charge (149) .

•.

H.- A FAIR

TRL~

IN A F--UR TRIBu'XAL

· The Fourteenth ,Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part' : "nor shall any /State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, ·without due process Qf
la\v {150) ". An j~np9_rtant trend oi the past two decades has
been the construction :oi this ::elause to make effective against
the States other amendments which restrained federal action
(151). But the requirement of due process has its ow"ll content
as well. "'A fair triaLin a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process (152)."
Sustained PI"ejudici;1.l pulJlicity prior to trial may make
it impossible to obtain.· an impartial jury .(153). · The judge
must transfer the venue to another jmiqdietion where passions
are not so inflamed {)r eol1tinile the case 1mtil the effect of the
publieit~r hits h~n ·{liss:i1>ated (154). He must isolate the jury
(147) AREA, Ranxin and .Snmz, :The Manhattan Bail Project : An Interim Bepot! on the Use of Pre-Trio! Parole, S8 lLY.U.L.Q. fil (1953).
(148) U.s. Const. mnenli. -V:I.
·
'
(149) Klopfer v. State,.of N,or!h. C<:rrolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1957).
(150) U.S. Canst. amend. )(IV.
. .
..
(151) Gi!low v. New 'fori:, ~ U.S. 652 (1925) (1st 'mnend.): Vlo1!, BUPr<X n0~~-107, Mapp, supra no!e 10~. <!Cer, supra note -94 (4th mnend.,): Mailoy, supra .nOte
137 (lith omend.) ; G1deol1; ,:supra ~;~ole. 125; ICJopler, supra note 149 (6th amend.~._
(152) In ze .MuclliSon, ::149 u.s: i33, 136 (1954).· · · •·· · ..•·. ·
(153) Th& defendant is 'entitled to trial by b jury of his peer..; U.S. ~( :,
Art. .UI and Amend. Vl.
.
_
(IS4J Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S•. 717 (1961)~
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from the effects of newspaper and radio reports during the
trial (155), and the televising of a criminal proceeding is forbidden {156). Any limitation on spectators and newsmen at
the trial must be applied "IYith regard to the defendant's constitutional right to a "public trial" (157).
The accused is entitled to an unbiased judge (158)~. The
jury, too, must be impnrtial (159). ~omvhitcs cannot be·
convictcr1 b:v· a jur::· if the state limits jury service to
white (160). The Court has reversed munerous convictions because of subtle dic:;criminatory jury selection procedures (161).
Similarly, the state may not maintain racial segregation in the
.court. {162).The accused is also entitled to fairness on the part of the
prosecution. It may not knowingly use perjured testiillony
·or knowingly mislead the jury as to a material fact (163). It
cannot suppress 6xculpatory evidence which would assist the
defendant in his case (164).
Another protection ·of the accused's right to a fair trial is
the requirem€nt of the Si.....-th }unendment that he "be confronted with the witnesses against him" (165). This has been
construed to apply to the states.
In one case. the petitioner w·as com-icted on eYid.cnce which
included statements of a witness made at a preliminary hearing at wllieli the petitioner was present without counsel. The
witness· "~as not a>nilable at the trial. The Court held that
in the ahsence of counsel petitioner did not have a constitutionall:v· adequate right to cross-examine the witness and that
the right to confront thr v;itness includes the right to cross-

(ISS) Sheppard v. Maxw-ell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
(156) Estes v. Texas, 38! U.S. 532 (!965).
(157) U.S. Cons!. =end. VI. Red Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 {!948).
(!58) See Tumey v. Ob.io, 273 U.S. 510 (!9Z7) where conviction for illegal
po3session of in~oxication liquor was r-eversed because the jc.dge was cornpenscrted from the fines paid by convicted persons. 28 U.S.C. sec. 144 provides :
c \Vhenever a par!y to =Y proc-oedinq ma!:es and files a timely and suf.icient
affidavit that the judge before whcm the matter is pending has a personal bias
or prejudice eit.'ler aqainst him or in l:::rvor ol any adverse party, such judge
ahal! proceed no further therein, but another judge .shall be assigned to hear
such proceeding. ~
(159) U.S. Canst. amend. VI Remmer v .United States, 350 U.S.
{1956).
(160) Strauder y. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
(161) Norris v. Alabama, 29~ U.S. 587 (1935) ; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559
(1952) ; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
(162) Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
(163) Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See Miller v.
386 U.S. 1

m

(1967).

(164) Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
(165) U.S. Con.st. amend. Vl.

Pate,
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examine him (166). But if the defendant's conduct ic; greatlv
disruptiw of the trial, the judge can eontinur trial '~i.thmit
. him until he promises to behave, can punish him for contempt
or ordrr him hound and gagged (167).

I. - DOUBLE .JBOPARDY
" ••• JHW shall an~· person he suhjcet for the same o:ff('n.<:;e .
to be twi<'P put in jC'Opardy of life or limb (168)."
Thf' State with all its r.esmtrces and power should not be
c(lllOil'Cd to 1nal;c +epeated attemptJ; _to _convict _lilt all.IJ,qed
offender, thereby S1lbjecting him to embarrassment,
expense anrl ordenl and compelling him to lit•f in a cmdimting state of an."C1-B(1J ancl f-nsecurity, as wdl as ndwncing
the possib;?-ity that e-ven thmtgh ·innoce.11t he ma?f be fomul
gw1ty (169 ).

The Court has been zealous in its :protection of the inclividual. ~.l..-comiction of murder in tl1e seeond degree was held
to amount to an acquittal of murder in the first degree which
precluded a new trial for the graver offense when the conviction for the le~ser ofi't•nsc was on-l'tumcd (170). An at"quittn 1
impropcr1:-· <li1w:te<l =~~- thH jwhc beeausc of prosccutorial
misconduct "·as held to b?..r a nc·w trial (171 )_ Even when
the jury ·was {l:i~ehar~cd before any te::.1:imony had been offered
because tJH' prnsrf'ution failrd to issue a summons to its principal witness. the Court held that the ddrnil.ant eould not 11e
tried b:-;- a ~<'<•ona jury (112). This pi·ohihition against double
jeopardy also prevents the states from trying an individual
twice (173).
·
Nevcrthr1ess, the possibility of being tried twice for the
same aet persists. An aef{nittal of a federal e1~imc does not
bar rcprosecution for a ~tatt~ c1·ime although the factual elements of the crimes arc identical (174). Similar1)-, a state trial

(166) Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 {1965).
(167) liiinois v. Allen. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
(169) U.S. Cons!. amend. V.
(169) Green v. United States, S5 U.S. 184. 187-88 {1957).
(170) Id ..

(171)
{172)
(173)
(174)

Fang Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 n962).
Downum v. United States, :r!Z U.S. 734 (1963).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U;S. 784 (1969).
Bortlcus v. 11Jinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), But acqulttai of municipal crime
~ .teP!~"=:'!!on__ ~r--~__state crime .where elements are identical. Waller ··v.
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for an offense does not bar a federal prosecution (175). This
retrogressive state of the law has some prattical beneficial
effects for human rights si11ce indiTiduals in the South who
might be acquitted in the state courts or given mild sentences
for offenses against rivil 1·ights workers are still subject to
federal prosrention (1 76).

J. -

TJIMITATIO~S

ON CRI.:.\IIN.AL STATUTES

There· are numerous- constitutioiial-limitations on:· ·what
conduct may be made criminal. ''Xo Dill oi Attainder or ex
post fnct Law sh<Jll be pas.-,cd" (177). "No State shall ... pass
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto I.1a·w..." (178). A statute
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to its provisions what conduct on theii· part will render them liable to
its penalties (179). The Court will reverse a conviction where
the reeord :rewals no evidence of the defendant's guilt (180).
Constitutional guarantees previously discussed, such as the
right to free speech, protect certain conduct from criminal
sanctions. The Court has also fuu11d a right of marital prinlCy f·m~matiil~ from s.:vcral S1t6:iric constitutional guarantees
which prevents a statt! from making the use of contracepti,·cs
a criminal offense (181). The prohibition against· the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment" (182) prohibits the
enactTT1ent of laws punishing the status of an individual, e.g.,
drug addiction (183).
·

K. -

PlJNISIIMENT

The main concerns of the Court have been with the proce..c;ses of apprehension of a suspect and adjudication of his

075) Abbate v. United .Stat<~!!, 359 U~S- 187 (1959).
(176) United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1965). Defendants acquitted In
state murder trial were later tried under federal law lor attempting to discou·
109e negroes from entering the ,;tate .by the murder of a negro who had done

sec.

ao. (177] U.S. Const Art. 1.
9, cl 3. See U.S. v. Bxown, supra note C.
(178) U.S. Const. Art I, sec. 10
(179] See Lanzetta v_ New jersey, 305 U.S. 451 (1939) Invalidating a statute
which made it a crime to be a member of a • gang ».
(180) Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
{l81j Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
(182) U.S. Consl. amend. VIIL
(183) liobinson v. Caliiomia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), But the Court upheld a
conviction lor being found in a state of Intoxication In a publlc place. Powell
.,., T~aos, 392 U.S. 514 (1968].
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guilt. The Court now may begin to concern itself with the
treatment of persons convicted of crimes. .A. district court
has already found thnt. conditions in one state prison where
inmatt:::; were subj~e<:t to Yiolcnce and homosexual attacks from
other inmates constituted "·cruel and unusual -punishment~' and
ordered the state to improve cnndi).ions or close the -prison (18-±).
'Ihe Court is now facing a series of challenges by indigents
to inequities resulting from jail or fine sentences e.g., $50 fine
or ten days in jail. In the first -case this nature, the Court
dealt_ with __ a sentence for the maximum term provided- by
statute plus a fine permissible under- the statute. The· Courtheld that the indigent could not he macle to serve any additional time for his failure to pay the fine. "\\~ e conclude that
when the aggregnte imprisonment·exceeds the maximum period
fL--ced by the st:ltute and results directly from an involuntary
nonpayment of a fine or court costs ·we are confronted with an
impermi~sibLe di:-crimiuatitm that
re..,ts on ability to
pay {185) :" A eomp:.mion case was rcmandi;d to the lower
courts beemse t11e state ltad changed the statute which was
being ehnllan,Q"ed. Fonr of the nine judges in an opinion concurrin<:: in the remand e:;:pres,;ed their opinion a<> to eases where
the j;cil ter:2: st:lTcd for 1wnp3~·ment of the fine might be less
than the jail semew~e which the court could ha-ve given initially for the crime. ~The constitution prohibits the State from
imposing n fine as a scntrnec and then automatically ~onverting
it into a jail term solel: because the defendant is indigent and
cannot forth•>ith pay the fi~e in f~l" (186).

L. ~<\1.'\"D

RIGHTS OF JUVENILES
:MILITARY PERSONNEL

At least two categories of pcl'Sons have been historically
denied mnny of the protections afforded by the Constitution.
The juvenile court s:-stem was ado-pted under the theory that
the state would take the role of the parent, and consequently
procedural rights would not be available. However, the Court
recently held that the due process clause requires delinquency
adjudications to "measure up to the essentials of due -process

(184) Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970).

(165) Willlazrur v. fllinou, m U.S. 235, 24G-l (1970) •.
(186) Mon'U v. Schoonfieid, 399 U.S. SOS. 509 (1970).
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and f<lir treatment" (187). The precise nature of the "essentials'' i~ still being litigated.
The rights of military personnel are protected by the
Uniform Cone of :\Iilitary Justice: Congress ic; empowered
·"To make mles for the Government and regulation of the
land and naval forees." {188). ·whether other constitutional
gnarantet·s ;we still applicable to militm·~- persmmel is liDclear (18!:1). The military courts have acted on the as.mmption
that such .guarantees a;pply. but that the factual context of
military life permits many infringements on liberty which
would7.not ·be permissible if imposed -On-civilians (190}.

III. -

EQUAL
PROTECTIOX OF THE LAWS
,

Respr·r.t for the law is based in part on the belief that the
laws are iair and the society which they preserTe is just. The
riots whieh han occured in the United States in recent years
in Xe-..v York, New Jersey, :Michigan and California indicate
that manT negroes in the United States don't believe in the
fairnc--.~ of the l:n;- or the justice of the society.. The Fourteenth Amt:EL1JHent guarantees to all persons the •~equal pro-·.
· tection oi the laws." (191). Tlris JH'O'\'ision has, however, not
been suffieim1t .to cope with deeply rooted social prejudice,
and it hns ht>C'H neeess<ll":\' for the federal and state legislatures
to aet against i·acial · di5;crimin~tion. Several developments
in eliminating 1:acial discrimination have already been noted
in the sections devoted to '\"oting, freedom of speech and
assemhly, anl1 iair trial.
The l'tlst twenty years have seen an abrupt reversal in the
attiturle of ~n hranehes of government from toleration of racial
discrimination to a resolve to eliminnte it. Previously, the
Court had pennitted racial separation if the separate facilities
were equal (192). This made each case a factual one of

(187) ln lie Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
(188) U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8.
(189) Compare AppliC'Crtion ol Stapley. 246 F. Supt>. 316 (D. Utah 1965) with
Kennedy v. Commandant, United Stales Disciplinary Barroc±s, 258 F. Supp. 967
(D. Kan 1960).
·
{190} United States "'· Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 155, -:rt C.M.R 429 (1967! upholding
the conviction ol an officer for carrying a sign in a demonstration which 5aid
« Let'li have l!lore than a choice between petty ignorant fascists in 1968 " and
c End Johnson's fascist aggression in Vietnam. •
{191) U.S. Canst. amend. XIV.
{192) Pleuy Y. Fer:guson, 163 U.S. 5'¥1 (la96).
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presenting masses of physical, social and psychological data
to prove the facilities were not €qual-a task which few were
'\v.illing and able to undertake. Begjnning in 1954 the Court
found that classifications based on J"ace violated the equal
protection clause. Thus, all that needed to be shown to im·alidate the law was that the state separated the races. The
Court ha.<> also been inerc!asing-ly willi11g. to find state parti!:ipation in raeial discrilllinntion rendering it illegal even thong-!1
the .state involvement mt:;v· be minimal and indiJ"ect. Finall:·.
the President and Congress during the last decade have taken
an affirmative role by laws and exe€utive orders directed at
eliminating discrimination .

•-\.. -

EDUCATION

The best" known landmark in the str~ggle against racial
segregation is Brown '1). Board of Education, (193) which held
that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws. "'To separate ··' [school children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
communitv·that maT affect their hearts and minds in a wa,unlikely ~,·cr to h~ undone" (194). States atto~mpted t'o
avoid the effects of the Brou·n decision by closing public
schools and using state or county funds to support directly or
indirectly privately· owned schools which were segregated. The
Court held this unconstitutional (19;1). Volunta-ry transfer
plan.<> based on racial factors tending to perpetuate former
segregation were inva:lidated (196). The Attorney flrneraJ was
empowered by legislation to bring suits to int<'gTatc schools

{193) ~7 U.S. 483 (19s.l). Brown was based on the equal protection clause
of the Fourleenth Amendment, but in Boliinq v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497 (l!?s.l), the
Court held that school segregation in the Ir.strict of Columbia where the Fourteenth Amendment does not crp;:>ly was a violation of the due process clause
o! the Fifth AI<lendment Since Brown, the Court has held segTega:tion unconstitutional in numerous other areas. including public beaches and bathhouses
{Mayor of Baltimore v. D<TM>on, 350 U.S. 877 [1955]), municipal golf courses
(Holmes v. Cily of Atlcmta, 350 U.S. 879 [1955]). b:.1ses (Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 {1956)), public parks {New Orleans City Park Development Ass"n.
v. Defiege, 358 U.S. 54 [1959]). >=urjcipal audito:-iums (Shiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395
0964JJ. The repudiation in Brown oi the «separate but equal • doctrine Jed
to the conclusion that race is not a valid basis !or classiliccrtion in a legislative
enactment. Consequently. laws barrin:J interracial marr10ges o:re unconstitutional
although they penalize both th .. white and the nonwhite. Loving v. Commonwealth ol Virginia 388 U.S. l (1967).
(194) Brown, supra :note 193 at -l94.
(195) Sr. Helena Parish School Board v. Hall. 358 U.S. 515 (1962) : Griffjn
Y, County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964}.
(196} Goss v. Board ol Education, 373 U.S. 683 (~963).

whencwr private persons were unable to do so (19i). Southern
!lchools have long delayed intcg-r:Jtion, using the language of
the Hrmc·n deeision-'"with all dclihen.Jte spced"-as an authorization to stall, but the Court has said "continued operation,oi
segregated schools under a standard of a1lowing 'all deliberate
speed' for tlcsegrcgation is 1io longer constitutionaly permissible.
(198). Some states in the deep South refuse to integrate
unless orcl1•red by the Court in the local area. This means
that a suit mnst he hrou,g-ht in each individual district in order
to get the sehool in that dLstrict se~'Te::,>"Uted. The expenditure
of manpower to obtai11 this end is enormous and progress has
been Yer:~ slow~, The federal govemmcnt has failed to enact
the ~nd of significant legislation ·which it enacted ·with respect
to voting- rights. aii.d the·· rcsoi1rees of priYate groups such
as the 1\.A.~\.C.P. Legal Defense Fund, Inc. which bear the
primm~- brunt of the integration effort are quite limited.
However, as· a result of the Court dcci<;ions, integration will
be ordered in every case in the deep South .where a suit is
brought. The <>:s:ecutivc, so far, has always been -..villing to
enforce the court urders to prcn:nt anar1:ll;"- mu1 disrrsp{'Ct
for sut:h orders. Thus, :although the process is slow and painful, inte:;ration \\ill eventually result (1991. It is hoped that
additional resources will be devoted to the efforts to obtain
integration in· the schools.
The state polie:' of segregation in the South has its eounterpart in "de facto" segregation in the North. Social and
economic: disr-rimii1atiDn has resulted in negroes living in
the same areas in large cities. Children are assigned to the
school nearest them. Thus, v.ithin the C'it~\dde school system,
one sehool may be prC'dominantly negro while the others are
predominantl~' whitt>. The problem has not yet heen successfully resolved. The underlying job and housing discriminations which l<'ad to ghettos arc being attacked, but many
lower eourts have ]wld that the school Loarcl<; have no affirmative dnt:· to rPalign school districts to achie...-e hetter intc-

(197) 42 U.S. C. sec. 2000 c-6.
(199) Alexander v. Holmes County Board ol Education, 3S6 U.S. 19 (1969).
(199) This assumes that the white and black population continue to live in
the same neighborhood as !hey have historically done in te South. There is
aome evidence,· however. that whites are leaving the city in the South, to avoid
Integration among other reasons, ond this tendency may result in de facto
liChool segregation in the South. The Courts have been attempting to lace
the problems this presents. One type ol plan would require· students to take
buses to schools out of their immediate neighbourhood so that an appropriate
racial balance could be achieved. Some varieties of this plcm are being argued
before the court as this paper is written. Charlotte Meddenburg Board v. Swann.
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gration (200). School boards may take race into account in
order to relieve racial imbalance (201), however, and the state
·of Massachusetts requires school disiticts to prepare a plan to
eliminate racial imbalance whenever the total number of
nowhite students in a public school is in excess of fifty percent
of the total pupils (2021.

B.-HOUSIKG
A state court may not enforce a restrictive eo..-enant on
pr;opcrty which prohibits· sale to negroes (203)'. At least si.-.;:teerr
states have :fair housing la-ws requiring nondiscrimination in
sale or rental which apply to private housing (204). California attempted to abrogate its :fair housing law by an amendment .to tht:, state constitution which prohibited the state
from limitim; the power of the individual to selLto whom he
choses. The Court found that this amendment provided
state authorization of discriminator~ practices. The Court
said that the amendment encouraged housing discrimination
and was, therefore, 1mconstitutional as state action aiding
racial discrimination f205).
All dq,artments a.nJ agencies of the federal government
have been directed by executive order to take action to prevent
diserimimition in the sale, leasing or rental of any government
mrned, operated, or m'"isted housin~; (206). In 1968 Congress
pas..o;;ed a statute (207) which forbids discrimination in the sale
or rental of housing b~- an~-one except by an individual selling
his own personal residence or an individual renting to less
than :four families in a dw:elling which the owner himself
occupies. In the same year the Court intNpreted a statute
which had been enacted in the nineteenth century 208) shortly
after the Ch-il War to forbid discrimination. in salf's hy pri-

(200) BeTJ v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F. 2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963). But

aee Bod:er v. Board of Education of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 151 (1S55).

{201) Addabbo v. Donovan, 22 App. Div. 2d 383 (2d Dept. 1955). affd. 16 N.Y.
2d 619 (1965). cert. den. 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
(202) Mass G. I.. ch. 71, sec. 37D.
{203) Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 {1948).
(204) Emerson, Haber and Dorsen, Political end Civil Rights in the United
States lSl8 (1957).
{205) Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 {1967).
(206) Executive Order No. 11063, V Fed. Reg. ll527 (1962).
(201) 42 u.s.c. § 3601.
(208) c All citizens of 1he United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by while citi::eru thereof to inherit, purchase,
)ease, sen, hold and convey real and personal property." 42 u.s.c. § 1982.

.•
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vate individuals to others {209). Since then the old Civil
'Yar statute has been ap1•licd to rights in a country club 1vhich
was associated with a housing development (210). _AJ.thongh
the cases interpreting the old Cidl Rights statute involved
large developments, their reasoning indicated that even
private individunls who would be exempted from the 1~68
lcgisla~ion would be f>rohi11ited from discriminatin-; in the sale
oi property by the earlier statute. The 19G8 statute provides
more efiecth·e JWO!:edm'es and extensive remedies, so it is p1'Cferable to the civil injunctive proceedings under the earlier
statute.

C. -

E~IPLO"Yt.:IENT

.

Thirty-sh states have la·ws which make racial discrimination in employment illegal (211). Discrimination in federal employment is prohibited (:212) and contracts of private
companies 1v-ith the government include a clause aga.inst discrimination (213). In addition, the Xational Labor Relations
Act makes it an uniair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
diseriminate against an employee (214). A labor union which
acts a~ the statutory representative of a craft has· "'at least
as exacting a duty to protect C(fually the interests of the
members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a
legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those
for whom it legislates (215).
Employment in activities or il1dustries affecting commerce
and employing more than t>\Cn:ty-five persons for at least
twenty v/eeks each year are covered by· Title VII of the Ciril
Rights Act of 1964 (216). 'l'hat Act makes it illegal for an
employer or labor org-m:iization to discriminate against any
indh..Jdual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. This includes practices such as advcltising for employment or membership which indicates preference or discrimination. Lower courts have interpreted the prohibition

(209) Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1969).

t210)
t211l
t212)
t213)
t214)
(215)

Sullivan v. Little Hunting Parlc, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
Emerson, Haber and Dorsen, supra note 204 at 1512-13.
Executive OrdeT No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965).
Id.
20 U.S.C. sec. 141.
Steel v. Louisville and Rashville B.R. Co., s2:J U.S. 192 0944).

(:ll6) 42 U.S.C. sec. 2CJOOo.
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against discrimination in Title VII not on1v to forbid discrimination in hiring but also to require cmplf;yers in promoting
and filling vacancies to consider their negro employ(•i.:s on tho
basis of seniority with the company and not to utilize past
· discrimination against nrgTocs in certain types of jobs as a
hindrance to thrir future promotions. In other words, n€gro
employees who ha1l heen discriminated against in the type
of job availal;le to them, ·arc given credit for their past service
with the <~ompany in whatever capacity although white employees might he requi1·cd to have served in a particulal' type
of job 'vith the company before being eligible for promotion (217).

D. -

Pll3IjiC ACCO!IThiODATIO);'S

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids discrimination in
facilities O\v!Jcd C218) m· operated (219) h~- the state or any.
subilivision thereof. Thirty-seven stntrs have enacted civil
rights statutes 11ronding ('rimina1, civil and/or administrative
remedies for persons subjected to discriminatory treatment in
the use of public accommodations (220) (facilities open to the
public whether owned h)-- the state or by -private individuals).
The most thorough covf'rage of this area i<; Title II of the
Ch-il Rights Act of 1%-± ;;hich rmvides that "All persons
shall he entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, :privileges, advantages, accommodations, as
defined in this section, without diserin1ination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin (221)."
This statute applies to all public accommodations affecting
commerce with an exemption for "private clubs"'. But the
courts have strictly construed this exception. For example,
an effort by the proprietor to make ·an amusement area a
••private club"' by establishing membership cards and dues to
gain entrance to the area ;ms struck down by the Court as a
ruse or device to avoid the statute (222).

Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Suw. 5()5 {E.D. Va. 1968).
Burton v, Wilmington Parldng Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
See Evans v. Newton. 382 U.S. 296 {1966). See also no! 180.
Emerson, Haber and Dorsen, supra note 204 <It 1679-80.
(221) 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000a. Upheld as constitutional. Heart of Atlanta
Motel lnc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 {1964). ~zenbach v. McClung, 379
(217)
(218)
(219)
(220)

u.s.

294 (19&1}.
(222) Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). The senna case Ulustrates the
scope of the limitation to c places otlecting commerce. • · The only ties which
the recreational facility had to interstate commerce were . that it was open to
Interstate travelers, that the Ingredients of the hot dogs, rolla and &O!t drinks
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In the past two decades there have been many developments strengtheilill~ human rights in the United States. The
right to vote has been extended by the abolition of the poll
tax awl hy law J•l'otecting the rights of the negmes. Restrictinns on SJWcch and movement have been sharply limited. The
rights of the citizen have been secured mo.re firmly by the applieation to the states of the constitutional guarantees against improper federal goYernmental action. The most significant development in this area has heen the :formulation of a set of rules
for police conduct suusequPnt to arrest. It is only within the
past two decades that the United States has faced ·up to the
probh,ms of r.wial discrimination and begun to do something
to combat them.
This vaper Jw.s discussed developments in human rights.
It has not looked carefully at those areas of fear, prejudice,
ana arbitrary ~H·tion where progress ha.••; not been made. :Much
has been done. but much remains. Yet the accomp}ishments
of the past offer hope for steady advancement in the future

aerved at the refreshment stand came from other states; .that the juke box was
lllade out of s:tate, ant that its paddleboats were leased irom em out-ol-st¢e
company. Amost every place open to the public wou\d have that much of a
relationship to interstate commerce.

